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Abstract
Background: Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
requires Parties to the agreement to take proactive measures to protect health policy from the vested interests of
the tobacco industry. Parties to the FCTC are required to submit periodic reports to the Convention Secretariat on
the efforts undertaken to implement it. Previous analyses of national compliance with the FCTC suggest that Article
5.3 implementation is piecemeal and insufficient in many contexts, with governments relying on general
transparency and other existing policies for the purpose of Article 5.3 implementation. No in-depth study of Article
5.3 compliance within the European Union (EU) – a signatory to the Convention – has been undertaken. This study
seeks to assess the extent of Article 5.3 compliance in European Union institutions, through an analysis of the
mechanisms in place in the European Commission and European Parliament. It analyses EU documents relevant to
Article 5.3 compliance, as well as semi-structured interviews with policy actors in the EU institutions and the field of
tobacco control.
Results: As with many national governments, Article 5.3 compliance within EU institutions is partial and incomplete.
Much of the compliance activity cited in EU reports is derived from general codes of conduct for EU staff and the
Juncker Commission’s transparency agenda. Interview respondents reveal widespread lack of knowledge about the
existence of the FCTC and Article 5.3 amongst key policy actors across the institutions. Within the Commission policies
vary greatly between Directorates General, and issues surrounding the conceptualisation of the role of Members of the
European Parliament affect implementation in that context. While there is growing awareness of the issue in both the
Commission and the Parliament, in large part as a result of the experience of lobbying over the Tobacco Products
Directive, there remains considerable resistance in both institutions to further substantive action to implement Article 5.3.
Conclusions: We recommend that a binding and comprehensive policy and code of conduct, specifically designed for
the implementation of Article 5.3 and based on the World Health Organization’s guidelines, be created to cover the
activities of all employees of all EU institutions. Crucially, such guidelines would need to deal explicitly with third parties
acting for the tobacco industry.
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Background
Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)
requires governments to take measures to protect health
policy “from commercial and other vested interests of
the tobacco industry” [1]. Moreover, Parties to the FCTC
are required to submit periodic reports to the Conven-
tion Secretariat on the efforts undertaken to implement
its provisions, including Article 5.3, via responses to a
standardised questionnaire, which are publicly available
online. In 2008, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to
the FCTC adopted a series of guidelines and recommen-
dations for the implementation of Article 5.3 [2]. Conse-
quently, scholars seeking to assess compliance with
Article 5.3 have both a data source and a set of criteria
against which to assess governments’ activities in this
area. In the first large-scale assessment of Article 5.3
compliance, Fooks et al. [3] used these data to undertake
a comparative, quantitative analysis of compliance across
Parties to the agreement. That study found that Article
5.3 compliance was highly selective, with only 16% of
guideline recommendations reviewed being imple-
mented across all Parties. Moreover, 83% of Parties that
had taken some action under Article 5.3 had imple-
mented less than a third of the guidelines. There are few
other systematic evaluations of Article 5.3 implementa-
tion, although what little work there has been confirms
Fooks et al.’s analysis that implementation has been only
partial [4–7].
The present article seeks to build on the previous,
macro-level, analysis of Article 5.3 compliance conducted
by Fooks et al. [3], through an in-depth, qualitative case
study of the European Union (EU). Fooks et al.’s analysis
did not include the EU since, as a supranational organisa-
tion, it is not strictly comparable with state Parties to the
FCTC. Nevertheless, as a Party to the FCTC, independent
from its member states, the EU is bound by its provisions
and must undertake separate compliance activities. Fooks
et al. [3] also concluded that in-depth qualitative case
studies, drawing on key-informant interviews, were neces-
sary to better understand Article 5.3 implementation, in
part since widespread misreporting in FCTC Party reports
suggests that many public officials have a weak under-
standing of Article 5.3. Additionally, many Parties were
found to implement Article 5.3 through existing generic
guidelines on corporate lobbying and transparency, while
others implemented Article 5.3 through working norms,
rather than through explicitly codified guidelines, making
it difficult to assess how effective compliance efforts are in
practice.
The intensity with which transnational tobacco compan-
ies (TTCs) have lobbied EU institutions, most recently
over the 2014 revision of the EU’s Tobacco Products Dir-
ective (TPD), has been well documented [8–10]. Such
lobbying appears to have had significant success in influ-
encing policy outcomes [11]. The EU represents the most
ambitious and advanced form of institutionalised
transnational governance in history, based on a series of
(periodically revised) foundational treaties, secondary
legislation and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU), collectively known as the acquis
communautaire. Given this complexity, implementation
of Article 5.3, and the evaluation of that process, are
extremely challenging. Consequently, we focus here on
the main supranational legislative and policy-making
bodies – the European Commission and the European
Parliament (EP) – and the Article 5.3 guideline recom-
mendations that are most relevant to them, but take note
of the implications of our analysis for other EU bodies
where relevant. The Council of the European Union (‘the
Council’) and the European Council (on the distinction
see [12]), are more difficult to analyse in this context as, in
representing the interests of member states, their activities
involve national-level policy actors. Thus a full exposition
of Article 5.3 compliance in the Council and European
Council would require analysis of policies and mecha-
nisms in place at the member state level, and is beyond
the scope of the current article. These bodies do, however,
have a joint permanent secretariat, employed directly by
the EU and tasked with the organisation and administra-
tion of Council business, although these are dwarfed in
size by the Commission. Functionaries employed in these
institutions are in a position very similar to Commission
officials in regard to Article 5.3 compliance. Thus, recom-
mendations we put forward in relation to EU officials are
applicable not just to the Commission, but to those in the
Council secretariat and other EU agencies and institutions
(e.g. the CJEU, the European Central Bank, the European
Ombudsman, the Committee of the Regions and the
Economic and Social Committee).
We focus on WHO Article 5.3 guideline recommenda-
tions 1.1–1.2 on awareness raising, 2.1–2.2 on limiting
interactions with the tobacco industry, 4.1–4.11 on the
avoidance of conflicts of interest, and 5.1–5.5 on trans-
parency (see Table 2). We do not focus on recommenda-
tions 3.1–3.4 on the rejection of industry partnerships,
or on recommendations 6.1–6.4 on the denormalisation
of industry “corporate social responsibility” activities,
although we note in this context that important ques-
tions have been raised about whether the EU’s partner-
ship agreements with the largest TTC’s on illicit trade
are compliant with Article 5.3 [13, 14]. We also do not
focus on WHO recommendations 7.1–7.3 on preferen-
tial treatment of the tobacco industry, or on recommen-
dations 8.1–8.3 on state-owned tobacco industries, since
these are less relevant to the EU institutions.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss our
methods. Second, we briefly describe the principal
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functions and processes of the Commission and the EP
for a non-specialist audience. We then discuss generic
transparency processes in the EU, as a necessary context
for the presentation of our results. Third, we present our
results, beginning with an analysis of documents related
to the EU institutions in general, before proceeding to
analyse Article 5.3 implementation specifically in the
Commission and the EP. Finally, we discuss the results
and conclude.
Methods
Our methods consisted of two steps: first an evaluation
of documents and, second, a series of semi-structured
interviews with key informants. We first reviewed a
number of publicly available documentary sources relat-
ing to both generic practices on transparency and ethical
behaviour within EU institutions, and to the specific im-
plementation of Article 5.3. The latter included EU
reports to the FCTC Secretariat and documents relating
to the European Ombudsman’s inquiry into a complaint
against the Commission that it had failed to properly
implement Article 5.3. The former included documents
setting out generic rules and guidelines on ethical behav-
iour for EU officials, including the Staff Regulations for
EU officials, the European Code of Good Administrative
Behaviour, the Code of Conduct for Commissioners and
the Commission’s Practical Guide to Staff Ethics and
Conduct, many of which were cited by the Commission
in relation to Article 5.3 compliance in its submissions
to the FCTC Secretariat and to the European Ombuds-
man. However, given the lack of governmental under-
standing of Article 5.3, and the requirements for its full
implementation previously identified [3], it is conceiv-
able that the Commission (like some national govern-
ments) perhaps underreported relevant measures in
place. Therefore, we did not rely on the self-reporting of
the Commission in the identification of relevant policies,
and instead pro-actively searched for relevant documen-
tation beyond those cited in reports to the FCTC Secre-
tariat. This led, for example, to the identification of the
Code of Conduct for Members of the European Parlia-
ment with Respect to Financial Interests and Conflicts of
Interest [15], and the Guide to the Obligations of Officials
and Other Servants of the European Parliament - Code
of Conduct [16], which were not referenced in Commis-
sion reports to the FCTC Secretariat. Below, we analyse
documents which refer to the EU overall, to the Com-
mission and to the EP in the relevant sections. A larger
volume of documents was identified pertaining to the
Commission than to the EP. In part, this reflects the
case brought to the European Ombudsman against the
Commission in relation to Article 5.3 and the transpar-
ency agenda launched by the Commission in the wake of
this. As will be discussed below, it suggests also a
piecemeal and incomplete approach to Article 5.3 com-
pliance, as well as to broader issues of conflict of inter-
est, across the institutions.
Second, we conducted a series of qualitative, semi struc-
tured interviews (n = 32) between February 2015 and
December 2016 with policy actors in Brussels and Dublin,
engaged in, or with knowledge of, tobacco-control issues.
Interviews were conducted to address the potential draw-
backs, discussed above, of relying on self-reporting by
actors who may have limited understanding of the
requirements of Article 5.3 compliance. Moreover, they
allowed us to examine and probe compliance measures
and knowledge of Article 5.3 within the institutions in
greater detail. This allowed us to develop a more nuanced
understanding not just of activities and structures in place,
but the underlying norms governing institutional
approaches to the FCTC and Article 5.3, and to conflicts
of interest more broadly. As well as specific questions
about Article 5.3 and about generic policies and practices
relevant to Article 5.3 implementation, interviews focused
on two key policy areas relevant to tobacco control and
tobacco company policy influence at the EU level that had
been central to the work of the Commission and the EP in
the period during and immediately prior to the interviews:
the passage of the EU’s revised TPD, and trade negotia-
tions relating to the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) with the US and the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada.
Tobacco industry lobbying in EU institutions was exten-
sive during the passage of the TPD [8, 9], while external
trade and investment agreements are a key responsibility
of the Commission and have been identified as offering to-
bacco companies wide-ranging opportunities for policy
influence [3, 17, 18]. Identification and recruitment of
interview respondents was via purposive (from documen-
tary reviews) and snowball sampling (from interviewees)
until we had reached saturation [19]. Access was sought
via email and telephone contact and interviewees gave ex-
plicit informed consent for participation and interview re-
cording, indicating the level of anonymity they requested
for their responses. Respondents could indicate whether
they could be identified by name, organisation or in more
general ways, which would avoid them being identified
personally, i.e. by organisation type or sector. Interviews
were generally around an hour in length, although some
lasted up to an hour and a half. A wide range of actors
agreed to be interviewed, giving multiple perspectives on
EU tobacco control, including representatives from NGOs
and civil society as well as the relevant EU institutions. A
breakdown of respondents by sector is provided in Table 1
below. Due to ethical issues specific to engaging with the
tobacco industry, no interviews were conducted with in-
dustry actors [20]. Interviews in Dublin were included due
to the vital role played by the Irish government in the
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passage of the TPD during its presidency of the Council of
the European Union in the first semester of 2013, and the
wider leading role played by Ireland in European tobacco
control. Interview responses were triangulated with the
documents discussed above. Interview recordings were
transcribed, anonymised and stored on a secure drive.
The first author coded interviews using Nvivo data
analysis software through an iterative, two-stage process
of analysis. Initial codes were derived from the WHO’s
Article 5.3 guidelines. Further codes were identified in-
ductively through an initial reading of interview tran-
scripts. These were added to, and used to refine, the
initial list of codes in liaison with the second author.
This code list was then used to code the transcripts sys-
tematically in the second reading via Nvivo. This allowed
for the coding of topics and themes not directly related
to, and not directly corresponding with, the implementa-
tion guidelines. Inductive themes identified related to is-
sues such as awareness and understanding of Article 5.3,
how policies and ethical guidelines are implemented in
practice, and the norms and ‘culture’ of EU institutions
that influence the latter. The presentation of data below
is not primarily organised around method, although
document analysis generally precedes the presentation of
interview data. Rather our analysis is organised primarily
around the WHO Article 5.3 implementation guidelines
and the institutions examined. In each section we draw
on both documentary and interview data to build a
detailed picture of compliance activities, drawing on the
principle of triangulation. Given the relative lack of
documents relating to the EP, this section draws more
substantially on interview data. To ensure maximum
anonymity for respondents, our default approach is to
attribute all quotes by sector only, except where
additional details were essential to contextualise the
statement or underline its reliability, and permission for
more precise attribution was given by respondents. Eth-
ical approval for this study was granted by the relevant
ethics committees at the authors’ institutions. Below, we
provide a brief overview of policy-making processes in
the EU and set out the development of generic transpar-
ency rules and practices in the EU institutions. This
provides a necessary context for the subsequent analysis
of measures explicitly targeted at Article 5.3 compliance.
Policy making in the European Union
Any evaluation of the implementation of Article 5.3
must take into account the specific political and institu-
tional context under consideration. Here, we briefly set
out the main aspects relevant to the Commission and
the EP. The Commission is a unique political institution
and a key body in the EU system, performing core
policy, legislative, monitoring and enforcement functions
under EU law (see [21]). At the apex of the Commission
hierarchy is the College of 28 Commissioners, drawn
from each of the member states and assigned an individ-
ual policy portfolio (e.g. Health, Single Market, etc.).
Commissioners are supported by their personal staff
known as their Cabinet, with the Heads of Cabinet
playing highly influential roles in Commission business.
Below this are the Directorates General (DGs), Director-
ates and Units into which the Commission bureaucracy
is organised. DGs are organised in terms of policy port-
folios which map broadly onto those of the College. The
Commission is designated the “guardian of the treaties”
and is tasked with ensuring EU law and policies are
implemented. It administers and distributes the EU
budget, and is responsible for undertaking negotiations
with third parties, including international accords such
as the FCTC. Whilst EU legislation is passed by the EP
and the Council (on an equal footing under the "ordin-
ary legislative procedure", which is the default legislative
procedure in the EU; see [22]) they can do so only fol-
lowing a proposal from the Commission, which has the
sole right of initiative. As such, the Commission plays a
vital agenda-setting and policy-development role and is
a key target for lobbyists and policy advocates.
The role of the EP is to represent the interests of EU
citizens via directly elected Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs). It plays a central role in the legisla-
tive and budgetary procedures and has the right of ap-
proval on the appointment of the Commission and in
external, third-party agreements (see [23]). As with na-
tional parliaments, much of the work of the EP in scruti-
nising legislation is undertaken by specialist committees
prior to votes in plenary. For example, the Health and
Environment Committee (ENVI) was the lead commit-
tee for the TPD. The EP is structured around party
groupings, with the largest two being the Centre-Right
Table 1 Interview Respondents by Sector
Brussels Dublin
Officials (EU/ national civil servants) 4 0
Parliamentarians
(Members of the European Parliament/ Oireachtas, and their advisors) 4 4
Public health NGOs 10 6
Journalists 1 3
Total 19 13
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European People’s Party (EPP) and the Centre-Left Pro-
gressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). In
committees, each piece of legislation is assigned a rap-
porteur with responsibility for the passage of the bill
from one of the party groupings, with others assigning
shadow rapporteurs to present their group’s interests.
For the 2014 TPD, the rapporteur in the ENVI commit-
tee was UK MEP Linda McAvan (S&D), shadowed by
Germany’s Karl-Heinz Florenz (EPP).
Transparency in the EU institutions
Concerns over lobbying within the EU institutions have
led to a series of measures being adopted, which aim at
increasing the transparency of contacts with external ac-
tors. Initially this occurred on a voluntary basis, with the
EP setting up a transparency register in 1995, followed
by the Commission in 2008, before these were
consolidated in a single register via an inter-institutional
agreement in 2011, itself modified by a further such
agreement in 2014 [24]. The inadequacies of the existing
voluntary regime were never clearer than during the
‘Dalligate’ scandal which surrounded the Commission in
2012 and led to the resignation of the Maltese Health
Commissioner, John Dalli, following allegations he had
met tobacco industry actors [25].The Juncker Commis-
sion’s “transparency agenda”, under the direction of First
Vice President Frans Timmermans, was a response to
criticisms of the Commission’s openness to lobbyists in
the aftermath of the Dalli affair. In 2014, the Juncker
Commission’s Political Guidelines included a range of
measures designed to increase transparency and
oversight of the Commission’s activities and its engage-
ment with external actors, including corporations [26].
More specifically, this has seen specific disclosure rules
for documents relating to the TTIP negotiations in
November 2014 [27] (discussed below), new rules
adopted for the open appointment of external expert
groups in May 2016 [28], and additional requirements for
document releases as part of the Inter-Institutional Agree-
ment on Better Law Making in September that year [29].
Of most relevance for the implementation of Article 5.3,
however, are the measures in place to monitor policy in-
fluence by external actors through the registration of lob-
byists. Criticism of the incomplete and porous nature of
the current voluntary regime, and the experience of the
TPD process, have led to proposals for a “mandatory”
Transparency Register covering the EP, Council and Com-
mission, put forward by the Commission in September
2016 [30]. This aimed to build on and extend the previous
regime, covering just the Commission and the EP. Under
the proposed Inter-Institutional Agreement, all external
actors seeking to engage the institutions in an attempt to
influence the content or implementation of policy would
need to be included on a central register of lobbyists in
order to be able to meet with the highest ranking officials.
Within the Commission this would include Commis-
sioners, Heads of Cabinet and Directors General. Within
the EP, meetings with MEPs, the Secretary General, Direc-
tors General and Secretaries General of political groups as
well as access to Parliamentary buildings would be limited
to registered lobbyists. As regards the Council, the pro-
posed agreement would cover meetings with Ambassadors
and Deputy Ambassadors of the current or forthcoming
Presidency, the Council’s Secretary General and Directors
General. The proposed agreement grants leeway to indi-
vidual institutions to extend the registration requirement
to meetings with other officials.
At the same time, it sets out a range of organisations
and types of interactions which are explicitly excluded
from the registration requirements. These include social
partners, religious bodies, representations made by citi-
zens in an individual capacity, national and sub-national
agencies of member states, third-party states and inter-
national organizations. As will be discussed below, the
wide-ranging nature of these exemptions could be used
to circumvent regulations by well-resourced corporate
actors. At the time of writing, the negotiations between
the institutions on the agreement were ongoing. On 15
June 2017, the Conference of Presidents of the EP (con-
sisting of the President of the EP and political group
leaders within the EP) approved the Parliament’s negoti-
ating mandate and on 6 September 2017 a tripartite
meeting between the Commission, the EP and the Coun-
cil took place ahead of the formal inter-institutional
negotiations on the agreement.
In the interim, the Commission announced in Novem-
ber 2014 that from 1 December that year it would pub-
lish details of all meetings of Commissioners, their
Cabinet Members and Commission Directors General
with all interest representatives, indicating that such
meetings should, as a default, be limited to individuals
and organisations registered on the transparency data-
base [27]. However, the declaration stopped short of a
complete ban on meetings with non-registered actors
and left open the possibility of meetings with lower-level
officials. In December 2016, MEPs voted to adopt mea-
sures limiting meetings to registered lobbyists, but this
was widely interpreted as non-binding and has not been
applied by all members. The Juncker transparency
agenda was frequently cited by respondents in relation
to Article 5.3. Below, we report our findings on explicit
measures undertaken to implement Article 5.3, begin-
ning with an analysis of relevant documents.
Results: Implementation of Article 5.3 in the EU
Commission reports to the FCTC Secretariat, covering
the years 2007, 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016, focus almost
entirely on generic transparency and ethical behaviour
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guidelines [31–35]. The reports for all years answer the
yes/no question on whether measures have been taken
to implement Article 5.3 in the affirmative, with most
years making reference simply to the Staff Regulations
for EU officials (set out in Regulation No 31 [EEC], 11
[EAEC]). The latter are reported to provide “legally
binding ethical standards” on officials that ensure the
application of “principles of independence, impartiality,
objectivity and loyalty” [36]. In response to a question
on the use of the WHO Guidelines on Article 5.3, the
2014 report to the FCTC Secretariat adds that the Com-
mission “consults stakeholders to the extent necessary
for the elaboration of the appropriate regulation on
tobacco products” and that the DG for health “publishes
the minutes of meetings with industry on its website”.
The report for 2016 elaborates on this by making refer-
ence to additional “ethical and integrity rules”, notably
the European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour
[37], the Code of Conduct for Commissioners [38], and
the Practical Guide to Staff Ethics and Conduct [39]. No
reference is made to the EP’s Code of Conduct for Mem-
bers of the European Parliament with Respect to Finan-
cial Interests and Conflicts of Interest (see below) [15].
The reports to the FCTC Secretariat further mention
rules on transparency, notably Regulation 1049/2001 on
public access to documents [40] and the Transparency
Register, noting that “as of 1st December 2014 Commis-
sioners, their Cabinet members and Directors General
publish information on the meetings they hold with lob-
byists” [35]. Only in the 2016 report is the question on
“ensuring that the public has access, in accordance with
Article 12(c), to a wide range of information on tobacco
industry activities” answered in the affirmative. Since the
Staff Regulations and the European Code of Good
Administrative Behaviour relate to all EU officials, we
discuss them here. Other documents and practices cited in
reports, which relate specifically to the Commission and/or
the EP are discussed in the relevant sections below.
The Staff Regulations govern relations between EU
institutions and their officials. Title II, Article 11, of the
Regulations contains provisions that deal with potential
conflicts of interest, requiring officials to refuse “any
honour, decoration, favour, gift or payment” (without
expressed permission) and to disclose any actual or
potential conflict of interest when being considered for
appointment. Such general measures go some way to
meet the WHO’s Article 5.3 guideline recommendations
4.1, 4.2, 4.5 and 4.10 on conflicts of interest, but they are
not specific to the tobacco industry. This lack of specifi-
city is important, since recommendation 4.2 specifically
states that Parties should “formulate, adopt and imple-
ment a code of conduct for public officials, prescribing
the standards with which they should comply in their
dealings with the tobacco industry” (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the recommendations indicate that Parties
should “inform and educate all branches of government
and the public about […] the strategies and tactics used
by the tobacco industry to interfere with the setting and
implementation of public health policies” (1.1) and the
industry’s practice of using third parties to further their
interests (1.2). Such measures require a specific policy
and code of conduct relating to the tobacco industry, in
addition to generic policies on conflicts of interest and
transparency. Title II, Article 16, of the Staff Regulations
contain provisions which meet WHO recommendation
4.4. These require officials to inform their institution if
they intend to engage in any occupational activity within
two years of leaving service; if the activity could lead to
a conflict of interest, the official could be forbidden from
taking it up or certain conditions may be attached to
their acceptance. Senior staff are prohibited from lobby-
ing their former institution, on matters for which they
were responsible, for a period of 12 months after leaving
office.
The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour
sets out general principles of good administration which
apply to relations between the EU institutions and the
public, but does not directly address the measures speci-
fied in the WHO’s Article 5.3 guidelines. However, the
same document contains five public service principles,
two of which – “integrity” and “transparency” – are of
direct relevance to Article 5.3, although they do not deal
specifically with the tobacco industry. The “integrity”
principle includes the following statement, which relates
to WHO recommendations 4.1, 4.6, and 4.10 on avoid-
ing conflicts of interest:
Civil servants should not place themselves under any
financial or other obligation that might influence
them in the performance of their functions, including
by the receipt of gifts. They should promptly declare
any private interests relating to their functions. Civil
servants should take steps to avoid conflicts of
interest and the appearance of such conflicts.
The transparency principle, which is relevant to WHO
recommendation 2.2, specifies that public servants
should “keep proper records and welcome public scru-
tiny of their conduct”, a statement that is relevant to the
European Ombudsman’s inquiry into the Commission’s
implementation of Article 5.3, discussed below.
The Commission
The central role played by the Commission within the
EU’s institutional architecture, suggests that it would be
the most likely of the institutions to have fully-developed
policies to manage engagement with the tobacco industry.
Of the documents cited in the Commission’s reports to
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the FCTC Secretariat, the Code of Conduct for Commis-
sioners (hereafter CCC) [38] deals specifically with the re-
sponsibilities of Commissioners. This contains a number
of provisions that go some way to meet WHO’s recom-
mendations on the avoidance of conflicts of interest (rec-
ommendations 4.1–4.11). WHO recommendations 4.1
and 4.2 advise Parties to “mandate a policy on the disclos-
ure and management of conflicts of interest” (4.1) and
adopt a code of conduct (4.2). These recommendations
are met by the CCC in a general sense, although not spe-
cifically in relation to the tobacco industry. WHO recom-
mendation 4.4 advises Parties to adopt a policy requiring
officials to “inform their institutions about any intention
to engage in an occupational activity within the tobacco
industry, whether gainful or not, within a specified period
of time after leaving service.” While not relating specific-
ally to tobacco interests, and in a similar vein to the EU
Staff Regulations, the CCC requires former Commis-
sioners to inform the Commission of any intent to engage
in an occupation during the 18 months after they have
ceased to hold office, a provision that will be increased to
two years from February 2018 once a new CCC enters
into force [41]. Where such an occupation is related to
the content of the portfolio of the Commissioner, the
opinion of an “Ad Hoc Ethical Committee” is sought and,
during that 18 month/two year period, former Commis-
sioners may not lobby Commission staff on matters for
which they have been responsible.
WHO recommendation 4.6 recommends that Parties
should require officials to “declare and divest” them-
selves of tobacco industry interests. The CCC requires
Commissioners to declare any financial interest that
might create a conflict of interest. Under the new code
from February 2018 they will be required to declare in-
vestments above €10,000 regardless of whether there
could be a conflict of interest and, in cases of a conflict
of interest arising from a financial interest, the President
of the Commission will be able to request divestiture or
placement in a blind trust. WHO recommendation 4.10
advises Parties to prohibit officials from accepting pay-
ments, gifts or in-kind services from the tobacco indus-
try. The CCC prohibits Commissioners from accepting
any gift with a value of more than €150 and from accept-
ing hospitality, “except when in accordance with diplo-
matic and courtesy usage” [41: 7]. While the measures in
the CCC therefore go some way to meeting some of the
WHO recommendations on conflict of interest, they do
not deal specifically with tobacco, and do not address
some recommendations in this area at all. They also re-
late only to the 28 Commissioners and do not cover in-
fluential officials below the College.
Commission officials below the rank of Commissioner are
covered by the Staff Regulations and the Practical Guide to
Staff Ethics and Conduct. The Practical Guide is not legally
binding but rather sets out in clear fashion the requirements
of the Staff Regulations and emphasises the need for officials
to behave in an ethical manner. In relation to interest
groups, it states that the Commission “has an obligation to
listen to all parties” but notes that, where meetings with
interest group representatives are held, “[a] written record of
such meetings should be ensured where these contain im-
portant information or may involve action by the Commis-
sion. Such reports should be registered and filed” [39: 12].
However, the decision of the EU Ombudsman, Emily
O’Reilly, in an inquiry into the Commission’s implementa-
tion of Article 5.3 was extremely critical, particularly in re-
lation to transparency measures (WHO recommendations
2.2 and 5.1–5.5) [42]. The Ombudsman’s inquiry followed a
complaint in January 2013 by Brussels-based NGO Corpor-
ate Europe Observatory (CEO) and four other
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that a number of
Commission officials had failed to disclose meetings with
tobacco industry representatives and that – with the excep-
tion of the DG for Health, DG Sanco (now DG Santé) –
the Commission had failed to guard itself adequately
against tobacco industry influence. In its opinion on the
case, the Commission insisted that its generic transparency
guidelines were consistent with Article 5.3 and argued that,
although Article 5.3 itself was legally binding, the WHO
implementation guidelines were not [43]. While DG Sanco
proactively publishes the minutes of all meetings with to-
bacco industry representatives, the Commission argued that
other DGs need not do so because Regulation 1049/2001,
which provides for public requests to access documents,
was sufficient to ensure transparency. Finally, the Commis-
sion argued that its Legal Services were not covered by the
obligations of Article 5.3 when meeting with legal represen-
tatives of the tobacco industry.
Interview data indicate that levels of awareness of Article
5.3 and responses to it varied between DGs, and suggest
that restricting proactive transparency measures to DG
Sanco creates ample opportunities for tobacco companies
to bypass it. As one official with internal knowledge of Art-
icle 5.3 compliance within the EU institutions commented:
They basically were not publishing proactively their
meetings. They weren’t publishing their minutes, only
DG health do. DG health do do this. But of course the
tobacco industry bypassed DG Health. They totally
ignored DG Health really. Well they don’t ignore it but
they lobby the legal services, they lobby the cabinets,
they lobby all the DGs across issues. And the Director as
well. So the Commission says that DG Health is
implementing it and that’s enough. We will say that
clearly it’s not enough because policy in the Commission
is made by the College. Of course, the legal services have
a huge say; the Cabinets, other DG’s, you know, industry
DG or whatever.
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This was mirrored by a respondent from CEO, who
commented:
So the Commission – most of any EU institutions
– would be the first to take these rules very seriously
and that clearly has not been the case. DG Sanco
started very late with introducing this online
transparency around meetings with the tobacco
industry or meetings on tobacco legislation in 2011.
From 2011, I think, they started uploading these
– the list of meetings and minutes from meetings,
which is a good thing – but it amazingly doesn’t
seem to be written down anywhere what the rules are.
It’s just a practice that was introduced in DG Sanco
but there is no paper trail.
The lack of a formal policy document codifying
procedures is indicative of the piecemeal and informal
approach to Article 5.3 compliance. Moreover, the
historical lists of meetings appear to be incomplete,
omitting certain meetings with the industry [44]. Des-
pite its shortcomings, DG Sanco’s approach compared
favourably to practices within other DGs, in which
there was no online reporting requirement or other
measures in place beyond the Commission’s general
transparency and ethics rules. The same respondent
thought the lack of specific compliance structures in
place in relation to Article 5.3 reflected the low level
of seriousness with which the matter was treated by
the Commission:
And when we, together with other NGOs, challenged
the Commission on [Article 5.3 compliance], and we’ve
had this long exchange of letters in which the
Commission would simply repeat its statement but
without making any attempt to be convincing or ... So
there must have been an internal decision that this was
not…. not only it was not important; it was important
not to implement the rules.
The respondent speculated that this obstructionism
reflected the overtly pro-business orientation of the pre-
vious Commission under the Presidency of José Manuel
Barroso, and concerns the Commission had about the
consequences of Article 5.3 implementation for their re-
lationship with business:
people in the Barroso Commission considered any
move towards implementing Article 5.3 as being a
dangerous precedent that could lead to a more
comprehensive transparency and ethics, demands on
the Commission also for other areas and, therefore,
they really dug their heels in the sand and refused to do
anything.
The same respondent suggested that difficulties in
restricting meetings with tobacco industry actors reflects
also the culture of the Commission and the sense of ob-
ligation which officials felt to meet with industry
stakeholders.
Other respondents argued that the Commission’s better
regulation agenda had been used as a pretext for not imple-
menting restrictions on tobacco industry access to policy
makers, given the apparent need for dialogue with industry
in order to reduce regulatory burdens. As one EU official
commented:
you’d have some lawyer saying, “Oh well, under
better regulation we’d have to talk to everybody
about it.” So you hear a lot of the similar
arguments, let’s say, coming from people which
actually came originally from the tobacco industry.
But it’s difficult […], in general health is never the
top priority politically.
The same official stated that, for many Commission
officials, the WHO’s Article 5.3 guidelines are seen as
optional:
Now they would’ve said, “Oh, the guidelines are not
legally binding, blah, blah, blah,” but doesn’t mean
you can’t do it. You know, it’s still a choice to do it.
A related point concerned definitional issues of
what constitutes a tobacco industry actor, and thus
who is covered by the restrictions on policy access
and influence set out in Article 5.3. These issues arise
perhaps most obviously in relation to trade associa-
tions and cross-sectoral business organisations – such
as Business Europe and the American Chamber of
Commerce (AMCHAM) as well as national asso-
ciations such as the Federation of German Industry
(BDI) and the Dutch Employers Federation
(VNO-NCW) – which have tobacco industry
members, whose interests they represent and which
may include TTC personnel in delegations attending
meetings with officials. As an NGO actor with know-
ledge of tobacco industry lobbying of the Commission
in relation to the TTIP negotiations underway during
the period of analysis commented:
I know [tobacco companies are] working through
AMCHAM […] on this issue. They are certainly
members in a number of AMCHAM committees
where TTIP is discussed. They have certainly
contributed to AMCHAM fact sheets and briefings
and whatnot, so there’s a lot of use of the trade
associations. But no, we have not invested a lot of
time into actually documenting all of these things.
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The Juncker transparency agenda, and the mandatory
register for lobbyists, was frequently cited by respon-
dents in relation to Article 5.3. However, interviewees
were sceptical about the degree of change they would
bring about. First, as with the issues in defining the
tobacco industry, there was some ambiguity about
precisely which actors count as lobbyists, and, therefore,
must be included in the register. For the purposes of
Article 5.3 monitoring, a law firm representing multiple
clients (often undisclosed due to privilege rules), for
example, may meet with Commission officials, but it will
be unclear from this if they discussed issues relating to
tobacco clients. Discrepancies in the information pro-
vided by the Commission to MEPs and the Ombuds-
man’s enquiry, relating to meetings between the
Commission Legal Services and lawyers acting on behalf
of the tobacco industry, highlight considerable uncer-
tainty amongst Commission officials about whether
meetings with such third party actors constitute engage-
ment with the tobacco industry and thus fall under the
remit of Article 5.3. Whilst officials had disclosed meet-
ings with tobacco company representatives to MEPs,
they had omitted them from evidence to the Ombuds-
man’s enquiry on the grounds that “the Legal Service do
not, in general, regard contacts with lawyers represent-
ing law firms providing legal advice to companies, as be-
ing contacts with the industry itself” [45]. This raises
questions about whether tobacco clients need to be ex-
plicitly referenced in meetings with lawyers for Article
5.3 to be relevant, or whether indirect representation –
for example, in relation to issues of common concern to
the tobacco industry and other industries – is enough
for a law firm with tobacco industry clients to be consid-
ered as a tobacco industry actor for the purposes of Art-
icle 5.3. These issues remain unclear, even in the WHO
guidelines.
Second, while the occurrence of meetings must be de-
clared, their content, and even precise details of who
attended, is not minuted to allow scrutiny of the issues
discussed. As one respondent with internal knowledge of
the EU institutions commented, the fact that meetings
with officials are recorded in this way is highly problem-
atic in terms of Article 5.3 implementation:
So say you meet Business Europe. What does Business
Europe of course do? You can bring in your Philip
Morris person and you can bring in anybody. You
don’t know. So it should always say who is lobbying
from the lobby side so then you exactly know, is it the
CEO [Chief Executive Officer], is it the lawyer, is it
the trade guy? So the names of the lobbyists […] the
names should be published of who comes because
often the lobbyists have different hats, under different
guises.
Third, as discussed above, the disclosure rules are lim-
ited to the most senior officials, leaving open the possi-
bility for more junior, yet nonetheless highly influential
functionaries (for example at the level of Deputy Dir-
ector General, Heads of Unit and others), to meet lobby-
ists and industry actors without the need for disclosure.
This offers a straightforward route to circumnavigate
even these rudimentary measures. Fourth, meetings are
only one mechanism among many (increasingly infor-
mal) channels which lobbyists may use to engage and
potentially influence policy makers. These forms of
engagement would fall outside the remit of the transpar-
ency register and disclosure rules and are very hard to
capture, posing further issues for Article 5.3 monitoring
and compliance. As the same respondent commented:
The Junker Commission do proactively publish
meetings at the high level, so this is a very good thing.
But first of all, 95% of Commission officials are not
covered. But also, influence happens in many, many,
many ways. Not just meetings. Meetings are probably
the most basic and – you know, you’re never going to
regulate all human activity. It’s just never going to
happen. But phone calls, dinners, you know, social
evenings. We see more and more in Brussels – it
tends towards social events because you’re not
captured then by the transparency register. It’s not a
meeting as such. If the organization doesn’t have
policy positions then it’s a social gathering you don’t
have to register. But you’re still influencing. You’re
still making personal contacts.
While it is possible to request details of meetings held
by other officials via freedom of information (FOI) rules
codified under Regulation 1049/2001, this is an arduous
and time-consuming process for organisations, such as
NGOs, with limited resources. Access to documents can
often be denied. As attempts by organisations such as
CEO to use FOI requests in the context of the TTIP
negotiations reveal, even where documents are released,
the information disclosed in them is often heavily
redacted on the grounds of data protection, rendering it
unusable [46]. Even for those within the EU institutions
it was difficult to obtain information about Commission
contacts with the tobacco industry during the TTIP
process. An NGO representative cited delayed and reluc-
tant compliance with FOI requests as an example of
this:
And then it took several back and forth, so the
Commission didn’t respond in the prescribed
timeframe which is 15 working days. They prolonged
the deadline. Then after the prolonged deadline, they
still didn’t respond. And then at one point, they did
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release, I think in the first response, they released two
documents: one meeting request and then a report of
that meeting from JTI [Japan Tobacco International].
But in the correspondence before, they had
mentioned other documents regarding Philip Morris
and also BAT, which weren’t included in the response,
which is why, then, [someone within the EU
institutions] filed a complaint, which you can do
based on the regulation. […] I think he did receive all
those documents. I’m not sure. But at least some
more but they were nearly 100% censored. So you can
see, “A-ha, BAT wrote a letter to the Commission.”
It’s 5–6 pages long. They outline apparently many
concerns that they have or interests, with regards to
the EU trade negotiations, but all of
this is blackened [i.e. redacted].
The respondent explained the reasons given for redac-
tion were that the documents potentially contained com-
mercially sensitive information, that it would endanger
international relations or interfere with internal decision
making processes. Article 9 of Regulation 1049/2001 sets
out the grounds on which the release of documents
originating in the EU institutions or member states
marked “top secret,” “secret” or “confidential” may be
refused “in accordance with the rules of the institution
concerned, which protect essential interests of the Euro-
pean Union or of one or more of its member states in
the areas covered by Article 4(1)(a), notably public
security, defence and military matters.” As is evident
from heavily redacted documents related to tobacco
industry contacts previously released and discussed
above, this provision offers wide scope to the Commis-
sion to withhold material of relevance not only to Article
5.3 compliance but to the wider transparency initiatives
often cited by the Commission in this context.
The European Parliament
Compliance with Article 5.3 within the EP was even less
substantial than in the Commission. In terms of docu-
ments analysed, no references are made to the EP or its
policies in Commission reports – made on behalf of the
entire EU – to the FCTC Secretariat. Despite this,
relevant policies are in place, and associated documents
were identified. The EP introduced its Code of Conduct
for Members of the European Parliament with Respect to
Financial Interests and Conflicts of Interest in 2012 [15].
This requires MEPs to disclose any financial benefits
received within 30 days via an established disclosure
mechanism, including their occupation(s) during the
three-year period before taking up office in the Parlia-
ment. It does not impose any restrictions on MEPs’
subsequent employment, other than to prevent them
from benefiting from “facilities granted to former
Members” should they engage in professional lobbying.
An Advisory Panel oversees the functioning and enforce-
ment of the code, advising MEPs on compliance and
producing an annual report on its activities. In addition,
officials within the EP are covered by a separate Guide
to the Obligations of Officials and Other Servants of the
European Parliament - Code of Conduct [16]. In this sec-
tion, we confine ourselves to discussing Article 5.3
implementation among MEPs. The omission of refer-
ences to the MEPs own code of conduct within the
Commission’s reporting demonstrates not just important
shortcomings in Article 5.3 compliance, but the Com-
mission’s focus on officials – and principally those
within the Commission – to the exclusion of elected
representatives at the EU level. It reflects also the differ-
ent roles of the institutions, and the different traditions
of transparency, access and conflict of interest (COI)
that exist within the Commission and the EP, and in re-
lation to legislatures and bureaucracies more generally.
The lack of EP-specific compliance mechanisms was
evident also among interviewees. Asked if there were
measures in place to ensure compliance with the
FCTC, one MEP answered bluntly: "no." A respondent
from CEO concurred, stating "in the European Parlia-
ment indeed there is nothing […] there really was no
form of implementation." In addition, interviews with
MEPs revealed a widespread lack of knowledge of the
FCTC, and of Article 5.3 in particular, even amongst
those active in the area of health. This was particu-
larly the case prior to the enactment of the TPD.
Asked if they were aware of the FCTC before this
point, one MEP involved in the deliberations on the
TPD commented:
No, in fact, the first time I realized, and I’m quite
embarrassed about that, but the first time I realized
that we had this convention was when [another MEP]
mentioned it during the first exchange of views on the
Tobacco Directive. […] in ENVI, showing up saying
that they wanted to follow that and they
recommended all the colleagues in the department to
follow that. And then I [thought] “Oh, my God.” And
then I took it up and read it and I talked with, for
instance, the [cancer NGOs in my home country]
about it as well, asking them about what is their point
of view on this and how should it be interpreted
etcetera. So, it gave me something to think about.
However, the volume of industry lobbying which
occurred during the TPD process [8], including the ‘Dal-
ligate’ affair, allied to the efforts of MEPs with an under-
standing of the issue to explain the significance of Article
5.3 to colleagues, led to increased awareness. A respondent
from an NGO engaged in tobacco-control issues suggested
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that this, in turn, created the impetus for the introduction
of more substantial compliance mechanisms:
I guess during the Tobacco Products Directive there
was no way they had time to think about [Article 5.3],
although they really did feel the pressure. And I
suppose this has created the momentum maybe for
some of them who have stayed […] to actually do
something about it. Whether they’re successful or not,
and what would be the mechanisms, I don’t know.
Following the conclusion of the TPD, MEP Gilles
Pargneaux led the formation of an ‘anti-tobacco’ group
within the EP with the specific objective of addressing
tobacco industry lobbying and influence over policy
making at the European level. The fallout from the TPD
process also set in motion attempts to address the issue
of tobacco industry lobbying and Article 5.3 compliance
across the institution. As the NGO respondent
continued:
At the moment, the Conference of Presidents [of the
EP] – so including [EP President Martin] Schultz –
are discussing 5.3 in the parliament. And they’ve
asked for a legal appraisal, but it was on their agenda
to discuss and they look as if they don’t want to do
much, even though the Socialists […] were not
necessarily against; the Greens are not necessarily
against. There are possibilities to do something with
the Parliament. At the moment there’s nothing. It is
clear that it would have to be enshrined in the rules
and procedures of the Parliament – yeah, we are
working on that. But at the moment there is nothing.
Despite the extensive lobbying that occurred during
the TPD, opposition to restrictions on engagement
with tobacco industry actors was evident amongst
some MEPs. Whilst many mainly Green and S&D
MEPs supported moves to address Article 5.3, oppos-
ition to this was both widespread and evident at the
highest levels of the EP, apparently including EP
President, Martin Schulz. As one NGO respondent
highlighted:
There were at least two letters sent to Martin Schulz
from MEPs asking for [measures to comply with
Article 5.3] and that was brushed under the carpet by
Mr. Schulz, who is not somebody who has too much
of an appetite for codifying ethics rules or
transparency rules or anything of that kind, it’s not
important for him. […] So I think that’s very clear,
there’s been no institutional … the institution has not
taken responsibility at all. There have been initiatives
by individual MEPs and by the Green Group to
unilaterally report on meetings they have had with the
tobacco industry and also, I guess, some more
cautious approach, but that’s all.
The opposition of the EP President to such proposals
is in keeping with the generally weak enforcement of
Article 5.3 within the Parliament.
As in the Commission, one of the principal ways of
addressing concerns about tobacco industry influence
in the EP appeared to be through attempts to in-
crease transparency in the conduct of business and
interactions with the tobacco industry. However, the
rhetorical commitment to openness appears to have
been difficult to implement in practise, with TTCs
often able to avoid scrutiny of their activities in subtle
ways. For example, as the previous respondent
continued:
I remember that there have been meetings also
connected to the TPD. Open meetings where on
the one hand it’s so-called transparent and open
and they have tobacco representatives there but as
soon as the meeting starts they say, “This is a
meeting with Chatham House rules.” Which is a
really obvious trick to openly – so-called openly,
to lobby MEPs and assistants to give credibility
to tobacco industry arguments. At the same time,
nothing can go out.
Citing transparency measures as sufficient in the con-
text of tobacco industry access and Article 5.3 compli-
ance is in keeping with the findings above in relation to
the Commission and EU-wide compliance reporting to
the FCTC Secretariat.
However, the implementation of Article 5.3 in the
EP presents additional challenges beyond those en-
countered in relation to the Commission. These arise
from the specific competencies assigned to the EP
within the treaties, the complexities of its working
practices and the issues which derive from the pres-
ence of differing (and at times conflicting) democratic
and political cultures from different member states
within a single institution, in addition to the ideo-
logical divisions between party groups common to all
parliaments. As with the Commission, there were def-
initional issues around what constituted contact with
the tobacco industry when they acted via third par-
ties, especially those that would not be considered
obvious industry allies. Whilst the connections be-
tween trade associations and tobacco company mem-
bers are perhaps unsurprising, other organisations
such as trade unions were also used as conduits for
tobacco industry interest representation, particularly
for politicians with close connections to the labour
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movement who may be less inclined to meet with
business groups. As one S&D Group MEP stated:
what struck me more is I was contacted by trade
unions. In general, the big one, the umbrella
organization in [my country], but also some concrete
organizations representing the tobacco workers. We
had a very big tobacco production in [my country]
years ago […] and we had a quite strong trade union
working with people working in the tobacco industry
and the food industry etcetera. And they were quite
active but I have a very good relationship with them
and they know my position and they respect it and
that’s how it is.
The role of trade unions in this context creates a chal-
lenge for Article 5.3 implementation, and for the wider
transparency agenda, in determining which entities
should be considered civil society bodies and/or social
partners and thus be excluded from the groups required
to register as lobbyists.
Two further barriers to the effective implementation
of Article 5.3 within the EP emerged from interviews.
First, it was evident that there were very different con-
ceptions of COI which informed the position of MEPS
from different member states on whether they were able
(or even obliged) to meet with stakeholders from differ-
ent sectors, particularly where they had some interest in
the MEP’s region itself. Whilst Commissioners and offi-
cials must (in principle at least) act on behalf of the
Union as a whole, rather than their home states, MEPs
are explicitly mandated to represent their constituents
and to maintain close links with the countries and re-
gions which elected them. In addition, specific concep-
tions of MEPs’ independence of mandate led to a
reluctance to preclude meetings with any specific group of
actors, even the tobacco industry. This approach assumes
that the underlying logic of Article 5.3 is derived from a
specifically Anglo-Saxon conception of COI, which was
alien to some other traditions of parliamentary representa-
tion within member states. The different status of MEPs
and officials is recognised formally in documents estab-
lishing the EU’s current transparency regime. The
inter-institutional agreement establishing the current vol-
untary registration mechanisms for lobbyists states expli-
citly that “the register shall respect the rights of Members
of the European Parliament to exercise their parliamentary
mandate without restriction” [24].
It is noteworthy how widespread the belief was that
the EP could not be subject to similar forms of regu-
lation to the Commission in order to implement Art-
icle 5.3. Even NGO respondents strongly in favour of
tobacco control seemed to accept that parliamentar-
ians were different from functionaries in terms of the
mechanisms which could be put in place for the pur-
poses of Article 5.3 implementation, given the differ-
ent role they performed, and their mandate to
represent wider society. As one NGO representative
commented:
I don’t know many countries where the MPs have to
record all the meetings of the industry. Because as a
legislator, you should have a different [role]. It’s very
difficult to convince MPs to accept 5.3. But outside
DG Sanco, that’s not normal.
Second, it was argued by some respondents that the
EP lacked an adequate legal basis in the EU treaties to
implement a mandatory code of conduct for MEPs,
which could preclude or at least regulate engagement
with the tobacco industry in line with Article 5.3. One
respondent from a health NGO claimed that such regu-
lations would in fact require a change to the treaties,
and that any such change would be politically problem-
atic, despite the obligations included in the FCTC. In
this context, they argued that a more effective ap-
proach than mandatory codes of practice and disclos-
ure requirements for engagement with tobacco
industry actors may be for ‘soft law’ approaches in
which MEPs voluntarily disclose their meetings. In
addition to the inherent weaknesses of self-regulatory
approaches, a voluntary disclosure requirement would
also fall some way short of the types of safeguards
against industry influence foreseen by WHO guide-
lines on Article 5.3 compliance.
One of the issues appeared to be that the legal obliga-
tions contained within the FCTC were not taken ser-
iously by key political actors and some individual MEPs.
As one MEP commented:
And I think it was only after the Philip Morris thing
[i.e. a leak of internal company documents (see [8])
revealing the company’s lobbying strategy] that they
started to understand that this did matter. I think it
was seen as “oh, god, you know, what is this” and –
again, a bit over the top. But I mean, I kept trying to
point out our government sort of signed up to this,
EU signed up to this framework convention and we
need to take it seriously, it’s not some joke.
This attitude to the EU’s obligations under inter-
national law evident in relation to the FCTC and Article
5.3 compliance stands in clear contrast to the approach
taken to EU law. The perceived need for an explicit EU
treaty basis for Article 5.3 compliance measures amongst
MEPs, outlined above, demonstrates the primacy
accorded to EU law over other international treaty
obligations.
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Discussion
As with Fooks et al.’s [3] study of national implementa-
tion of Article 5.3, we found that much compliance
activity at the EU level is passive or indirect; i.e. resulting
from existing policies, processes, mechanisms, and codes
of conduct, which are generic in nature and not directed
specifically at achieving the objectives of Article 5.3.
Most such policies in the European Commission and the
EP focus only on general guidelines concerning transpar-
ency, conflicts of interest and ethical behaviour. How-
ever, this approach does not achieve the objective of full
compliance with either the letter or spirit of Article 5.3.
For example, the WHO’s Article 5.3 implementation
guideline 4.2 recommends that parties adopt a specific
code of conduct relating to the tobacco industry. The
measures put in place by the Commission and the EP
appear inadequate for the purpose of providing full
transparency even in cases of non-tobacco business
lobbying, and are certainly insufficient to meet the
specific requirements of Article 5.3.
On transparency, the WHO’s Article 5.3 guidelines
recommend that Parties should limit interactions with
the industry to those that are strictly required for its
effective regulation (2.1) and that, where such interactions
are necessary, they should be conducted transparently (2.2).
While DG Sanco (now Santé) has implemented a working
norm requiring officials to publicly record meetings and
minutes, this remains insufficiently formalised and codified,
and even such basic measures have not been extended to
other DGs. Furthermore, the practice of Commissioners,
members of their Cabinets and Directors General to meet
only with organisations that are on the Transparency Regis-
ter and to publish details of such meetings does not extend
to more junior officials. As Fooks et al. [3] found, these
kinds of selective and incomplete measures offer extensive
opportunities for tobacco companies to shift lobbying activ-
ities to other venues, i.e. to target officials or DGs not cov-
ered by these provisions; a strategy that was pursued
extensively by TTCs in their lobbying over the TPD [8].
Moreover, practices based on working norms rather than
clear, written guidelines, as DG Sanco’s practices appear to
be, are vulnerable to poor implementation or to lapsing
when current post-holders move on [3].
In her decision on the inquiry into the Commission’s im-
plementation of Article 5.3, the Ombudsman found that
the Commission’s consistent refusal to proactively apply the
transparency policy of DG Sanco across all DGs constituted
maladministration [42]. While Regulation 1049/2001 [40]
provides for some retrospective level of transparency, it
places the burden on individual actors to identify and seek
out relevant material, rather than on the Commission to
place this in the public domain as a matter of course. Thus,
unless a citizen makes a request for access to documents,
or an MEP puts a relevant question to the Commission,
such meetings would remain undisclosed [45: para-
graph 35–36]. Furthermore, Regulation 1049/2001 could
not be effective where an official had made no official rec-
ord of a meeting. How can actors request documents to a
meeting they do not know has occurred? The Ombudsman
noted that Article 5.3 requires FCTC Parties to act – i.e. to
take proactive measures – to protect health policies from
the tobacco industry, and thus restricting the disclosure re-
quirement to DG Sanco alone left the industry able to
access other DGs in a non-transparent way. She recom-
mended that the more robust transparency measures put in
place by DG Sanco be adopted across the Commission,
including its Legal Services. She further noted the point dis-
cussed above, that the Commission’s policy – to publish
information on meetings held by Commissioners, their
Cabinets and Directors General with outside organisations
and to limit those meetings to organisations on the Trans-
parency Register – covered only a limited number of top
officials. In a strongly worded comment, the Ombudsman
stated that she would “have expected that the experience
gained by the Commission from the adoption of the TPD,
widely acknowledged as the most lobbied dossier in the
history of the EU institutions, would have convinced it of
the need to strengthen further its ethical rules” [42:
paragraph 23].
Aside from its limited transparency measures, the
Commission also referred in its response to the Om-
budsman to generic guidelines for its staff requiring eth-
ical behaviour, such as the EU Staff Regulations and the
CCC. Such guidelines meet the requirements of the
WHO Article 5.3 guidelines on the avoidance of con-
flicts of interest (4.1–4.11) to some extent, but they do
not deal specifically with tobacco industry interests, and
do not cover all of the WHO’s COI recommendations.
As noted above, the WHO’s Article 5.3 implementa-
tion guidelines [2] go beyond simple transparency
and COI measures, to include measures on awareness
raising and limiting interactions with the industry.
WHO guidelines on awareness raising stipulate that Par-
ties should “inform and educate all branches of govern-
ment and the public about… the need to protect public
health policies for tobacco control from commercial and
other vested interests of the tobacco industry” (1.1) and
that they should “raise awareness about the tobacco
industry’s practice of using individuals, front groups and
affiliated organizations to act, openly or covertly, on
their behalf” (1.2). Our interviews reveal an extensive
lack of awareness of the requirements of Article 5.3, es-
pecially among MEPs, with even those directly involved
in tobacco-control issues unaware of Article 5.3 before
their engagement with this topic. We found no evidence
of proactive attempts by EU institutions to inform policy
makers and officials about Article 5.3 or to educate them
about the political strategies of tobacco companies, other
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than the ad-hoc actions taken by those working on the
passage of the TPD. Without a specific policy and code
of conduct implementing Article 5.3 it is extremely diffi-
cult to meet these awareness-raising requirements, or to
effectively monitor tobacco industry political activity and
fully meet the requirements of guideline recommenda-
tions 5.1–5.5, which specify the provision of information
by the industry and its proxies.
While intensive industry lobbying over the TPD has
raised awareness of Article 5.3 within the EP to some
degree, this has been a slow and gradual process and
there remains resistance to implementation among some
MEPs that are aware of it. This appears to be exacer-
bated by differences in political culture between member
states about how conflicts of interest should be handled.
It also raises issues about the legal mandate that MEPs
take from the EU treaties and whether this allows for a
requirement to limit interactions with stakeholders.
Whilst we must leave it to legal scholars to evaluate the
veracity of these claims, it is sufficient to note here the
continued opposition to increased transparency and
reporting requirements and the rhetorical and political
use of such arguments to this end. Our data suggest that
some MEPs see a strong mandate for independence in
the treaties, and that they take the legal obligations im-
posed on the EU by the FCTC as an international treaty
less seriously than those contained in the EU’s own
foundational treaties. As elected representatives,
accountable ultimately to their constituents, MEPs rep-
resent a distinct category of actor to appointed function-
aries, with different implications and challenges in terms
of Article 5.3 compliance. However, Article 5.3 does not
prohibit all meetings with industry representatives; it
simply requires that these be kept to those that are
strictly necessary and that where they take place they
should be transparent [47]. We note also that Transpar-
ency International recommends that the EP routinely
publish “legislative footprints”, i.e. track and publish infor-
mation on contacts and inputs received during the process
of creating policies and laws [48]. The adoption of such
transparency measures was further recommended in a
2008 resolution of the EP, and a small number of MEPs
have already voluntarily adopted these practices [48]. A
mandatory code of this kind would in no way restrict
MEPs’ freedom of action; rather it would simply increase
transparency and, therefore, the accountability of repre-
sentatives to their constituents.
The Commission’s claim that existing transparency
and ethical behaviour guidelines were adequate to
achieve Article 5.3 compliance, and that tobacco in-
dustry lobbying was now less of a concern since the
adoption of the TPD, reveals a clear failure to under-
stand the nature of industry political strategies and
the need to guard against these [42]. It fails to
understand the ongoing, and often indirect, nature of
tobacco industry political activity, which targets not
only explicit tobacco-control policies, but also other
policy areas, such as trade negotiations, that may
offer the industry opportunities to advance their
interests [17, 49]. As the Ombudsman noted, the
Commission’s approach “reflects a very short term
and random approach at the expense of a compre-
hensive and legally sound framework” [42].
Similarly, the EU institutions appear to have failed to
understand, and to make officials aware of, the use of
third parties (such as cross-industry trade associations,
consultancies, law firms and even trade unions) by
tobacco companies (as recommended by Article 5.3
guideline 1.2). Our interviews revealed extensive use of
third-party lobbying over the TPD and TTIP negotia-
tions, including by law firms acting on behalf of the
industry [see also 8, 45]. Yet the Commission, in its
response to the Ombudsman, was unwilling even to
accept that its Legal Services should fall under the provi-
sions of Article 5.3. The scope for third-party bodies to
lobby on behalf of tobacco interests appears to be exten-
sive in the EU, with little political will evident to guard
against this. We found only limited evidence of an
attempt to implement the WHO Article 5.3 guidelines
on limiting interaction with industry representatives
themselves (recommendation 2.1), let alone third parties
representing their interests. Our findings are presented
in summary form in Table 2.
The apparent reluctance to implement Article 5.3
guidelines fully suggests a prioritisation of business in-
terests over public health within the EU institutions, a
finding that is consistent with previous research [8, 50].
For some Commission officials, in particular, tobacco
control was not seen as a political priority which war-
ranted the measures to curtail tobacco industry influ-
ence contained within Article 5.3. Instead, it was feared
that restrictions on engagement with TTCs may be the
“thin end of the wedge” which would lead to similar
measures being introduced to curtail access to officials
by commercial, and potentially other, civil society actors.
This desire to balance health imperatives against the inter-
ests of businesses reflects that seen in other contexts, where
non-health ministries often see government-industry inter-
action as normal and are unwilling to alter their practices
in relation to the tobacco industry [5, 6, 51]. This under-
lines both the importance of international conventions like
the FCTC in creating a rationale for excluding TTCs from
policy making and the importance of signatories imple-
menting explicit policies and procedures to give effect to
them. Experience elsewhere suggests that establishing a
core group or committee under the auspices of the Minis-
try of Health, with representation from relevant NGOs, to
oversee the implementation of Article 5.3 can be an
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Table 2 WHO Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC (abridgeda): European Commission and European Parliament
Implementation
General Recommendations Specific Recommendations Commission Parliament b
Raise awareness about the
addictive and harmful nature of
tobacco products and about
tobacco industry interference with
Parties’ tobacco control policies.
1.1 Parties should inform and
educate all branches of
government and the public about
the addictive and harmful nature of
tobacco products, the need to
protect public health policies for
tobacco control from commercial
and other vested interests of the
tobacco industry and the strategies
and tactics used by the tobacco
industry to interfere with the
setting and implementation of
public health policies with respect
to tobacco control.
Not met.
Little evidence of awareness raising
among officials about the need to
protect policies from industry
interference, especially outside of
DG Sanco (DG Santé).
Not met.
Very low awareness among MEPs of
the need to protect public policies
from industry interference.
1.2 Parties should, in addition, raise
awareness about the tobacco
industry’s practice of using
individuals, front groups and
affiliated organizations to act,
openly or covertly, on their behalf
or to take action to further the
interests of the tobacco industry.
Not met.
No evidence of awareness raising
about the use of third parties by
the industry.
Not met.
No evidence of awareness raising
about the use of third parties by
the industry.
Establish measures to limit
interactions with the tobacco
industry and ensure the
transparency of those interactions
that occur.
2.1 Parties should interact with the
tobacco industry only when and to
the extent strictly necessary to
enable them to effectively regulate
the tobacco industry and tobacco
products.
Not met.
Officials do not uniformly limit their
interactions with the industry.
Not met.
MEPs do not uniformly limit their
interactions with the industry.
2.2 Where interactions with the
tobacco industry are necessary,
Parties should ensure that such
interactions are conducted
transparently. Whenever possible,
interactions should be conducted
in public, for example through
public hearings, public notice of
interactions, and disclosure of
records of such interactions to the
public.
Partially met.
DG Sanco publishes minutes of
meetings that do take place with
the industry, but other DGs do not.
Commissioners, members of their
Cabinets and Directors General
meet only with organisations that
are on the Transparency Register
and publish details of such
meetings, but this does not extend
to more junior officials.
Regulation 1049/2001 allows access
to some information by the public,
but places the burden on the
public rather than the Commission
and may provide partial (redacted)
information.
Not met.
MEPs do not uniformly record their
interactions with the industry. The
current voluntary Transparency
Register explicitly recognizes MEPs’
freedom of mandate and the
associated right to meet third
parties.
Regulation 1049/2001 allows access
to some information by the public,
but places the burden on the
public rather than the institution
and may provide partial (redacted)
information.
Avoid conflicts of interest for
government officials and
employees.
4.1 Parties should mandate a policy
on the disclosure and management
of conflicts of interest that applies
to all persons involved in setting
and implementing public health
policies with respect to tobacco
control, including government
officials, employees, consultants and
contractors.
Met by general regulations and
guidelines, including the Staff
Regulations and the Code of
Conduct for Commissioners,
although these are not specific to
tobacco.
Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interest and Conflicts of Interest,
although this is not tobacco
specific.
4.2 Parties should formulate, adopt
and implement a code of conduct
for public officials, prescribing the
standards with which they should
comply in their dealings with the
tobacco industry.
Met by general regulations and
guidelines, including the Staff
Regulations and the Code of
Conduct for Commissioners,
although these are not specific to
tobacco.
Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interests and Conflicts of Interest.
However, this covers only financial
COI and is not tobacco specific.
4.3 Parties should not award
contracts for carrying out any work
related to setting and
implementing public health policies
No data. No data.
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Table 2 WHO Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC (abridgeda): European Commission and European Parliament
Implementation (Continued)
General Recommendations Specific Recommendations Commission Parliament b
with respect to tobacco control to
candidates or tenderers who have
conflicts of interest with established
tobacco control policies.
4.4 Parties should develop clear
policies that require public office
holders who have or have had a
role in setting and implementing
public health policies with respect
to tobacco control to inform their
institutions about any intention to
engage in an occupational activity
within the tobacco industry,
whether gainful or not, within a
specified period of time after
leaving service.
Met by general regulations and
guidelines, including the Staff
Regulations and the Code of
Conduct for Commissioners,
although these are not specific to
tobacco.
Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interests and Conflicts of Interest, but
there are no restrictions on
subsequent employment during a
“cooling off” period.
4.5 Parties should develop clear
policies that require applicants for
public office positions which have a
role in setting and implementing
public health policies with respect
to tobacco control to declare any
current or previous occupational
activity with any tobacco industry
whether gainful or not.
Met by general regulations and
guidelines, including the Staff
Regulations, although these are not
specific to tobacco.
Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interests and Conflicts of Interest,
although this is not tobacco
specific
4.6 Parties should require
government officials to declare and
divest themselves of direct interests
in the tobacco industry.
Partially met by general regulations
and guidelines, including the Code
of Conduct for Commissioners,
although these are not specific to
tobacco.
Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interests and Conflicts of Interest but
this is not tobacco specific and no
explicit reference is made to
divestment.
4.7 Government institutions and
their bodies should not have any
financial interest in the tobacco
industry, unless they are responsible
for managing a Party’s ownership
interest in a State-owned tobacco
industry.
No data. No data.
4.8 Parties should not allow any
person employed by the tobacco
industry or any entity working to
further its interests to be a member
of any government body,
committee or advisory group that
sets or implements tobacco control
or public health policy.
Partially met by general measures in
place to mitigate conflicts of
interest in the appointment of
external expert groups, but these
are not tobacco specific. No data
beyond this.
Partially met through general
provisions in the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interests and Conflicts of Interest, but
not tobacco specific. No data
beyond this.
4.9 Parties should not nominate any
person employed by the tobacco
industry or any entity working to
further its interests to serve on
delegations to meetings of the
Conference of the Parties, its
subsidiary bodies or any other
bodies established pursuant to
decisions of the Conference of the
Parties.
No relevant data identified in
relation to this. No formal policy on
this identified.
N/A
4.10 Parties should not allow any
official or employee of government
or of any semi/quasi-governmental
body to accept payments, gifts or
services, monetary or in-kind, from
the tobacco industry.
Partially met by general regulations
and guidelines, including the Staff
Regulations and the Code of
Conduct for Commissioners,
although these are not specific to
tobacco.
Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interest and Conflicts of Interest,
although this is not specific to
tobacco.
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effective means of overcoming industry obstruction-
ism and the institutional inertia of non-health minis-
tries [6, 52].
Finally, there appears to be a clear hierarchy of legal
norms within EU institutions, which prioritises EU law over
the EU’s obligations as a Party to international treaties such
as the FCTC. The issue of Article 5.3 compliance presents
an example of where the EU’s foundational treaties are per-
ceived by some actors to come into conflict with its
international treaty obligations under the FCTC, e.g. the
apparent lack of an EU treaty basis for Article 5.3 measures
relevant to MEPs. While the independence of elected repre-
sentatives is an important issue that raises difficult ques-
tions in the context of Article 5.3 implementation, this
hierarchy of legal norms stands in contrast to the primacy
of EU law over national laws and the requirement of mem-
ber states to bring domestic regulations into line with EU
law. It also contrasts with the generally accepted binding
Table 2 WHO Guidelines for Implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC (abridgeda): European Commission and European Parliament
Implementation (Continued)
General Recommendations Specific Recommendations Commission Parliament b
4.11 Taking into account national
law and constitutional principles,
Parties should have effective
measures to prohibit contributions
from the tobacco industry or any
entity working to further its
interests to political parties,
candidates or campaigns, or to
require full disclosure of such
contributions
N/A Met in part by the Code of Conduct
for MEPs with Respect to Financial
Interest and Conflicts of Interest. A
full appraisal would require analysis
of national political parties and
campaigns, as well as at the EU
level.
Require that information provided
by the tobacco industry be
transparent and accurate.
5.1 Parties should introduce and
apply measures to ensure that all
operations and activities of the
tobacco industry are transparent.
Partially met through transparency
initiatives but these are not
comprehensive or tobacco specific.
Partially met through transparency
initiatives but these are not
comprehensive or tobacco specific.
5.2 Parties should require the
tobacco industry and those working
to further its interests to periodically
submit information on tobacco
production, manufacture, market
share, marketing expenditures,
revenues and any other activity,
including lobbying, philanthropy,
political contributions and all other
activities not prohibited or not yet
prohibited under Article 13 of the
Convention.
Partially met by the transparency
register in relation to lobbying, but
not comprehensive and not
tobacco specific.
Partially met by the transparency
register in relation to lobbying, but
not comprehensive and not
tobacco specific.
5.3 Parties should require rules for
the disclosure or registration of the
tobacco industry entities, affiliated
organizations and individuals acting
on their behalf, including lobbyists.
Partially met by the transparency
register in relation to lobbying, but
not comprehensive and not
tobacco specific.
Partially met by the transparency
register in relation to lobbying, but
not comprehensive and not
tobacco specific.
5.4 Parties should impose
mandatory penalties on the
tobacco industry in case of the
provision of false or misleading
information in accordance with
national law.
No relevant data identified. No relevant data identified.
5.5 Parties should adopt and
implement effective legislative,
executive, administrative and other
measures to ensure public access to
a wide range of information on
tobacco industry activities as
relevant to the objectives of the
convention, such as in a public
repository.
Partially met by Regulation 1049/
2001 on access to information by
the public, including meetings with
officials, but places the burden on
the public rather than the
Commission and may provide
partial (redacted) information.
Partially met by Regulation 1049/
2001 on access to information by
the public, but places the burden
on the public and may provide
partial (redacted) information.
aAs with the article more generally, this table focusses on certain guidelines which are most relevant to the focus of our analysis. Guidelines 3.1–3.4, 6.1–6.4, 7.1–
7.3 and 8.1–8.3 are thus excluded from the table. Where there is an absence of relevant data to evaluate compliance with a guideline we state this. Similarly,
where relevant guidelines cannot be applied to a supranational entity such as the EU (versus a state actor), or cannot be applied for any other reason, we mark
these ‘not applicable’ (N/A)
b Analysis of the European Parliament here is limited to MEPs, as opposed to permanent officials in the Parliament Secretariat
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nature of international trade and investment law and the
requirement of states and Parties such as the EU to imple-
ment the commitments this places on them, even where
this curtails the Party’s policy space [17]. It is not clear why
an international agreement to protect public health should
be treated differently. In its response to the Ombudsman,
the Commission asserted that, while Article 5.3 (and the
FCTC more broadly) was legally binding, the WHO’s Art-
icle 5.3 guidelines were not [43]. However, it has been ar-
gued that, as a document adopted by the COP, the
guidelines constitute a subsequent agreement under Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,
and should thus be taken into account when interpreting
FCTC Parties’ treaty obligations [3, 53]. While the wording
of the preamble to the guidelines suggests that they are
non-binding, they also “strongly urge” Parties to “imple-
ment measures beyond those recommended in these guide-
lines when adapting them to their specific circumstances”
[2]. Finally, we note that, following the entry into force of
the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU is required to
“ensure a high level of human health protection” in all its
policies and activities [54].
Conclusion
It is clear that EU institutions have some way to go in
order to properly implement the requirements of Article
5.3. While there is growing awareness of the issue in
both the Commission and the EP, in large part as a result
of the experience of lobbying over the TPD, there is also
considerable resistance to further substantive action to
implement it in both institutions, including at the high-
est levels of the institutions. Article 5.3 implementation
requires much more to be done to institutionalise rules
and practices guarding against the influence of the
tobacco industry. As the EU Ombudsman noted in her
decision on the inquiry into the Commission’s imple-
mentation of Article 5.3, the inquiry provided the Com-
mission with an opportunity to build on its experience
of industry lobbying over the TPD to set “a global
benchmark for compliance with Article 5.3” [42]. It has
so far failed to set such an example. While EU institu-
tions have pre-existing guidelines and practices that go
some way to meeting the requirements of Article 5.3 –
such as rules and guidelines on transparency and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest – these are not specific-
ally designed to meet the requirements of Article 5.3
and leave substantial gaps, which can be exploited by to-
bacco companies and their proxies. More research is
needed on Article 5.3 compliance in other EU institu-
tions and agencies not explicitly examined here.
On the basis of the results discussed in this article, we
recommend that a binding and comprehensive policy
and code of conduct specifically designed for the imple-
mentation of Article 5.3, and based on the WHO’s
guidelines, be created to cover the activities of all em-
ployees of the EU institutions. Crucially, such a code
would need to deal explicitly with third parties acting for
the tobacco industry. Article 5.3 compliance measures
and practices currently in place within DG Santé
(formerly Sanco) are the most advanced of any EU body,
despite their limitations, and may provide a model for
other bodies to follow in the first instance. DG Santé, or
other relevant entities within the Commission, should
also consider the convening of a core group or commit-
tee with a specific remit to examine the implementation
of Article 5.3 across the EU institutions, in consultation
with relevant NGOs, health experts and other EU
bodies. The need for proper awareness raising, among
MEPs and officials, is abundantly clear. While the dis-
tinction between elected representatives and appointed
functionaries is an important one, the EP should discuss,
as a matter of urgency, how Article 5.3 can be imple-
mented in a manner consistent with MEPs’ mandate.
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